ارائه راهبرد مطلوب در تخصیص آب با کاربرد تئوری بازی‌های غیرهمکارانه

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 گروه مهندسی آب دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد ایران

2 دانشیار گروه مهندسی آب دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران

3 استاد گروه مهندسی آب دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، ایران

چکیده

کاهش کیفیت آب و کمبود آن دو مشکل جدی است و مدیریت منابع آب مربوط به این مشکلات معمولاً با مناقشاتی همراه است. هدف از پژوهش حاضر، تحلیل رفتارها و تعاملات ذینفعان در حوضه کرج به‌منظور ارائه راهبرد مطلوب در سیاست‌گذاری پایدار منابع آب با در نظر گرفتن حفظ محیط‌زیست است. در این پژوهش، از تعاریف پایداری برای تحلیل نتایج حاصل از مدل گراف در نظریه بازی‌های غیر‌همکارانه استفاده شد. بازیکنان شامل سازمان جهاد کشاورزی، شرکت آب منطقه‌ای، کشاورزان و سازمان محیط‌زیست می‌باشند. نتایج حاصل از مدل گراف نشان داد که از بین تعاریف پایداری مورد استفاده در این پژوهش، تحلیل پایداری Non myopic برای تحلیل این بازی قابل اطمینان بوده و خروجی این پایداری، احتمال بیشتری در رخداد رفتار بازیکنان دارد. یکی از مطلوبترین نقاط تعادل، وضعیت پایه و نقطه تعادل دیگر وضعیتی است که کشاورزان برداشت غیر مجاز از کانال‌های آبیاری انجام می‌دهند که باعث وضعیت نامناسبی در آینده خواهد شد. لذا می‌توان با تعیین تشویق‌هایی از سوی شرکت آب منطقه‌ای به منظور همکاری کشاورزان و آموزش آن‌ها و نیز شناسایی و تنبیه متخلفان، مدیریت منابع آب را بهبود بخشید. در نهایت، نتایج نشان داد بکار بردن تعاریف پایداری مناسب، زمانیکه عدم اطمینان در مورد رفتار بازیکنان وجود داشته باشد، برای تجزیه و تحلیل مناقشه‌ای خاص، می‌تواند بینش ارزشمندی برای سیاست‌گذاری ایجاد نماید.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Proposing an Optimal Strategy in Water Allocation Using Non-Cooperative Game Theory

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Nourollahi 1
  • Ali Naghi Ziaei 2
  • Kamran Davary 3
1 Water Structure Engineering, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran.
2 Assoc. Prof, Department of Water Engineering, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad
3 Professor, Water Engineering Department, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Deteriorated quality and scarcity of water are two serious problems and the water resources management corresponding to these problems is often accompanied by conflict between consumers. The purpose of this study is to analyze the behaviors and interactions of stakeholders in the Karaj basin in order to provide optimal strategy in sustainable policy-making of water resources in this basin with respect to environmental protection. In this study, definitions of stability were used to analyze the results of the Graph model in non-cooperative game theory. Players include the Ministry of Agriculture, the Regional Water Company, the Farmers and the Department of Environment. The results of the Graph model showed that among the definitions of stability used in this study, Non-Myopic stability analysis is reliable for the analysis of this game and the output of this stability is more likely to occur in the behavior of players. One of the most desirable equilibrium states is the basic situation and the other equilibrium state is the situation in which farmers perform unauthorized withdrawals of irrigation canals, in which case an undesirable situation will occur in the future. Therefore, the water resources management in the basin can be improved by determining incentives from the regional water company for the cooperation of farmers and their training, as well as identifying and punishing violators. Finally, the results showed that using appropriate stability definitions can provide valuable insights for policy-making to analyze specific conflict, when there is uncertainty about player behavior.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Equilibrium states
  • Stability definition
  • graph model
  • Water Resources Management
  • Non-cooperative game theory
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