تحلیل پایداری معاهدات در رودخانه‌های مرزی با استفاده از نظریه بازی‌ها‌‌، مطالعه موردی: رودخانه هریرود

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 مدیریت منابع آب، دانشکده عمران، دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان، اصفهان

2 دانشیار گروه مهندسی عمران دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان

چکیده

در سال‌های اخیر، رشد روز افزون جمعیت و توسعه اقتصادی در سرتاسر دنیا منجر به افزایش تقاضا برای منابع محدود آب شده و مدیریت آن‌ها را به‌خصوص در حوضه‌های آبریز مشترک با چالش جدی مواجه کرده است. نظریه بازی‌ها یکی از مهم‌ترین ابزاری است که امروزه برای حل مناقشات و یافتن تعادل در سیستم استفاده می‌شود. در این مقاله با استفاده از رویکرد غیرهمکارانه نظریه بازی‌ها به تحلیل رفتار بازیکنان در حوضه مشترک هریرود پرداخته می‌شود. در این تحقیق ابتدا یک مدل جامع برنامه‌ریزی خطی جهت محاسبه سود خالص اولیه بازیکنان توسعه داده شد. سپس سود بازیکنان در سناریوی غیرهمکارانه تعریف شده محاسبه گردید. در گام بعدی، استراتژی بازیکنان با استفاده از شاخص‌های مختلف پایداری، تحلیل و وضعیت تعادل در هر یک از این روش‌ها بررسی شد. همچنین از مفهوم جبران انگیزشی جهت بررسی امکان تغییر رویکرد افغانستان از غیرهمکارانه به همکارانه استفاده شد. نتایج نشان می‌دهد، در رویکرد غیرهمکارانه سود ایران از مقدار 105×21/78 دلار به 105×80/43 دلار نزدیک به 45درصد کاهش پیدا می‌کند. هم‌چنین رویکرد جبران انگیزشی می‌تواند باعث تغییر استراتژی افغانستان از حالت غیرهمکارانه به همکارانه شود، به‌طوری که بر اساس بهینه پارتو امکان افزایش 40 درصدی سود ایران بدون کاهش میزان سود در افغانستان وجود دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

A Stability Analysis of Treaties in Transboundary Rivers Using Game Theory, A Case Study: Harirud River

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ali Shoghi Javan 1
  • Azadeh Ahmadi 2
1 water resource managemenr, Civil engineering, Isfahan university of technology, Esfahan, Iran
2 Associate Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran
چکیده [English]

In recent years, population growth and economic development all around the world has led to an increase in water demand and it has been a serious challenge to its management, particularly, in Shared River Basins. Game theory is one of the most substantial means of conflict resolution and reaching equilibrium in a system. In the present study, the players' strategies were analyzed through the non-cooperative approach of game theory in the shared basin of Harirrud. At first, a comprehensive linear programming model was developed to calculate the player's net profit. Then the players profit was calculated considering the defined non-cooperative scenario. In the next step, the players’ strategy was carried out using different approaches to analyze each of these methods and their stability are examined. The concept of intensive compensation was also used to examine the possibility of changing the Afghanistan's approach from non-cooperative to cooperative. The results showed that in Iran's non-cooperative approach, Iran's profits fall by nearly 45 percent. Similarly, the intensive compensation approach can change the strategy of Afghanistan from non-cooperative to cooperative. Therefore, according to Pareto's optimality, it is possible to increase 40 percent of Iran's profits without reducing profits in Afghanistan.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • game theory
  • Non-cooperative
  • Conflict Resolution
  • Stability Analysis
  • Transboundary River
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